November Voice Your Opinion Poll Comments:
Do you believe that new electronic voting technologies (e.g., touch-screen machines) reported the results of the 2004 election more reliably and accurately than older technologies?
1. I am a Webmaster and know how things can be "tinkered" with. Between the low level of computer security involved, and a maker of the machines saying he can bring the Ohio vote to the little oil boy, I have little trust in anything without a paper trail. (USA)
2. I have recently heard that the electronic touchpad voting machines have NO paper trail and cannot be audited to review whether the claimed vote count is, in fact, the true vote count. I believe this is very dangerous, as validation/verification of the vote is an essential capability in order to prevent tampering with the count. I actually cannot believe this type of technology can be permitted, esp. with past voting irregularities as a historic background from which we should all be more vigilant than ever. (USA)
3. There is no excuse for a modern democratic nation to use nontraceable, nonverifyable voting, unless it is deliberately to subvert the process. (USA)
4. The machines are fine, but they need an independent audit trail and a certification that cannot be tampered with without detection. Until these changes are made the results will be suspect. (USA)
5.There is sufficient evidence that it is impossible to achieve better than approx. 0.25% accuracy with any voting scheme. In addition, any voting method that does not allow for independent recounts by, e.g., a paper trail, will never satisfy the public, and oh, so right they are.(USA)
6. I have little knowledge on which to judge the relative reliability and accuracy of electronic vs. other voting methods, but that is the point: with no paper trail, it is impossible to determine the accuracy of the vote counts, and this may undermine trust in whole the election process. This is inexcusable. (USA)
7. Electronic voting without a hard copy trail and electronic standards for Federal elections is an open invitation for election fraud.(USA)
8. The issue is having a post-election, verifiable, paper ballot. That we do not have that currently is appalling. (USA)
9. Simple mark-sense sheets such as we have in Jefferson County, Alabama, provide the most reliable voting method for a number of reasons: One can see directly on the sheets for whom one really voted; they are a "paper record" and thus allow a true re-count; although they are counted electronically, and thus instantly, the readers are not subject to such hanky-panky as secret alterion of program code or hacking; the system is relatively inexpensive; and they foster short or no lines, since they tie up expensive machines only when they are inserted, a process requiring literally just a few seconds. Telling evidence for these assertions is that our system remained in place, without complaint, following the 2000 Florida election debacle. (USA)
10. Whether or not the machines provided an accurate count is not the issue. The fact that results cannot be checked or recounted makes a mockery of democracy. The fact that partisan corporate interests control our polling booths is a traversty. As Joe Stalin said: "It's not who votes that counts, it's who counts the votes" (USA)
11. Touch screen voting must be accompanied by an accurate paper record of the vote. There have been enough examples of touch screeen voting failing to regard them as infallible. Without a paper record that can be used for auditing, how can we be sure that the voting machines are working accurately. (USA)
12. Since there is no way to confirm that the electronic voting machines have given reliable tabulations, it is impossible to say that they are accurate. There have been many problems documenting their reliability and the companies providing the technology do not seem to be above suspicion. A paper verification is absolutely essential. (USA)
13. We must continue to push for open source code software as has been recently accomplished in Australia. This is even more important than paper trails. (USA)
14. The touch-screen systems do not provide both the transparency and the possibility of vote verification that is essential in a free and unbiased election. Unless these systems have a backup system, paper or otherwise, that is verifiable, they cannot be construed to be error-proof. (USA)
15. Touch screen voting without a paper (or other) record does not allow for a recount. Also, having the most expensive part of the process tied up for each individual voter does not seem to be the best system. Instant reading of paper ballots can include all of the safety features of the touch screen system with much less cost. (USA)
16. Any voting system which fails to provide a verifiable back-up cannot be considered to be 'accurate'. (USA)
17. The new methods *can* be better than the older ones. They *can* also be worse. As in most things this is not a black/white issue. There are far more than one binary variable in the equation. So this survey is pretty meaningless without a lot of caviots.(USA)
18. The current collection of votes is VERY heterogeneous as far as the technology is concerned. Older voters in particular may not find the proper way to enter their votes. I feel strongly that the voting technologies should be the SAME throughout the country. With the number of snafus reported again with vote casting I do not see why this year should have been better than in 2000. God knows if the final outcome would have been different with a uniform and non-tamperable system. (USA)
19. To have a court rule that voting machine code cannot be verified by others because it is "proprietary" information is ridiculous and a disservice to a democracy. (USA)
20. People are losing confidence in our voting process. This is disastrous for a democracy. Surely a country with the electronic and software talent possessed by the United States can develop a safe and accurate voting process. (USA)
21. The new e- voting process is as credible as the Republican party.... it's not! Get rid of the machines. (USA)
22. I wouldn't trust the present administration and their chosen providers. I used to check my bill when we ate out by casting out nines. I frequently found errors both for and against me. Since restaurants have switched to computation I find none. The same high standard could be achieved by an unbiased provider. This requires that absentee ballots be entered accurately and an equtable manner of choosing who is eligible to vote is obvious. (USA)
23. You should ask if the margin of victory was greater than the margin of error. A sloppy election with a great margin of victory could give the correct winner while a sharper election with a very narrow victory might give the wrong winner. A better question would be should this election be audited to determine the actual margin of error. Refer to the Amicus breif from the EFF Electroinic Frontier Foundation for some examples of election snafus. (USA)
24. I think one of the highest priorities is improving our "election system," which is currently 3,000 systems run by counties. Touch screen voting machines are a major part of that problem as currently configured. We need a technology that will assure voters that their ballot was cast AND COUNTED as intended.
Good national specifications for machines and for election prodecures would be a good start. AAAS should give this project a highj priority. I know some work has been done and planned by AAAS -- keep up the good work -- and give it HIGH VISIBILITY! (USA)
25. Voting machinery should not be in the hands of private outfits, and their programs should be reviewable, not proprietary. That this has not been so is a great defect of the present touch screen machines. I believe an independent public agency should be responsible for these machines. (USA)
26. I am a professional computer scientist, and I have talked with the state elections commission in my home state. They admit they have no expertise in computers or computer security.
I have studied the details (such as one can obtain them) of the electronic machines used in my home state. The software has flaws that one would see in good (but not in great) high school science fair projects. Were this software turned in by seniors at the state's premier university, the students would receive a failing grade. (USA)
27. Only if one intended to have the ability to manipulate voting patterns, tallies, or results would one think it legitimate to be unable to verify touch screen voting. (USA)
28. I fielded the first successful OCR scanners, two of which eventually wound up in the Smithsonian, although they are not presently on display. I also have a number of patents in the mark read field.
In my opinion, who operates the equipment and who has access is still key in both optical scan voting and touch screen voting.
I favor an entirely different method - telephone voice response after receipt of voter information at home from registrar's offices. I believe it would be easier to assure avoidance of fraud by this method than any other, although I won't try to describe here how that method would work and why it should do so well in avoidance of fraud.
It's for sure that voters wouldn't have to wait in long lines in the rain, voter participation should increase, and the economics would be great. (USA)
29. Electronic voting results are subject to post vote cast verification. This verification must be confirmed by the voter and subsequently documented through a paper ballot to be printed off and validated by the voter, at which point the validated paper product should then be secured and latter optically scaned for tabulating. Submission of the electronic
(digital ballot) can be made but verification of the vote by scanning the paper ballot would provide an immediate check of the digital vote and a paper ballot. Each ballot would have a vote number separate from the voter signature registration. Sounds simple, it is extremely complex but I suspect with all of the voting systems in place this approach would be
significantly accurate and all of the votes cast electronically could be counted and verified. Absentee ballots would simply be an optically scanable document similar, or the same as the above mentioned paper ballot and e-ballot.
Unfortunately, I assume that a portion of the voting public will need assistance to cast a ballot, so in all of the high schools during students junior and senior year a couse in public civic duty should be given to ensure that young folk (or older folk) are familiar with the voting process and are given training on how to vote, verify their vote, and to recognize improper polling place operations or political activity that might influence the vote. Additionally, the training would explain to folks how to regester to vote, how to contact and change their voting location , and how to verify that they are indeed a legal votee! Sorry for the length of this comment but voting ain't so easy...paper-rock-scissors might be a better approach...have the candidates play 100 rounds and have one individual count the
responses.....The rest of us can then simply go about our business and get on with the real working world of facts, figures, problem solving, and undermining the "evil-doers" ....whomever they might be! (USA)
30. Neither I nor presumably any other of your respondants know whether or not election administrators or criminals corrupted the software in one or more of the many thousand touchscreen voting machines utilized Election Day. As you know, only one small State required that touchscreen machines deliver a paper ballot for verification of machine counts. So please now ask your readers two more pertinent questions: First, if the U.S. Congress refuses to require that all machines deliver a paper ballot to the voter, which the voter then can deposit in a secure ballot box, will you help initiate/finance a law suit before the U.S. Supreme Court demanding such action? Second, if the U.S. Congress refuses to require that all communities allow and enable each political party at a poll site to count
(by hand or by scanner), any set of paper ballots it designates, will you help initiate/finance a law suit before the U.S. Supreme Court demanding such action? (USA)
31. With all of the skilled hackers that abound, I won't trust any electronic system that is not backed up with a paper ballot that is kept for recount. I have thought about this, and I think the system just abandonned in Boulder County is about the best system I can imagine. Punch cards about 3 x 8 inches were put in a punch machine which was easily worked. The punch was guided so that you could easily punch out a hole in the card by
the name of the person for whom you wished to vote. The punching was clean. There was no hanging chad. The punched cards were tabulated by an optical reader and a computer. The cards were kept for any needed recount. In addition, there were all of the normal internal checks on voter eligibility, etc. (USA)
32. After I voted I realized that I did not use a touch screen but rather a wheel that highlighted the person or referndum to vote on and I had to then hit a button to vote. At the end, I could review all my voting and even make changes if I wanted. I could query help whenever I wanted also. This was better than prior punch cards by a long shot. (USA)
33. No touch-screen machine that fails to provide the voter an accurate record of the vote that was submitted for counting and an auditable trail (preferably paper) can be considered reliable. A purely electronic recount is no more reliable than the original count. The programming of these machines needs to be transparent so auditors can see whether or not a rogue programmer has tried to alter the counts. (USA)
34. It is very unfortunate that political ideology shows profound bias in the replies of people who should know what it means to have scientific detachment. The editorial of 10/29/04 in Science is an example of the shamefully politicized thinking that is permeating the scientific community. Since the 1960s this has grown exponentially and it is profoundly affecting the objectivity of scientific opinion. (USA)
35. Electronic voting of any type should also produce a paper record. (USA)
36. The problem comes from the fact that machines without (preferably paper) audit trails make it impossible to know. I decline to express an opinion based on no evidence; I am appalled that an option that does not produce evidence would even be considered. (USA)
37. Here in Santa Barbara, we have a great system that works . We have no chads, all ballots are electronically counted, but are retained in case there is a recount.. See our process below.
*We first go to the sign-in desk. While we watch, the volunteers check our name and address in the book, we sign the book, and our name is crossed out with an ink pen, to show that we have voted.
*They hand us a marker pen and our ballot , which is in a protective sleeve to prevent others from reading our choices
* We go to a little booth, where we use the marker pen to fill in a paper ballot that has a small rectangle for each choice. The directions for how many rectangles can be filled in are directly below the name of the position to be filled.
* If we make a mistake in filling in the ballot, we go up to the table and exchange it for a blank one - the old one is destroyed on the spot.
*After each person completes their ballot, they put it back into the protective sleeve .
*We then take our ballot to a n electronic counting , machine, tear off the top tab, which we keep as our record of having voted.
*We hold the top of the sleeve up to the slot in the counting machine, where an electronic sensor starts the machine and the ballot slips into the machine, where it is recorded and stored.
* If a contest is later very close, or is contested, a manual count may be requested. The ballots are still there to be manually recounted.
* I think this system is as good as it gets.
38. The devil, as they say, is in the details. How accurate or reliable any given system is depends very much on the details of how it works, how it is administered, and how it is monitored. For touch-screen (or any other electronic system), one would need to ask: How clear are the instructions for the users? What are the details of the hardware and software used. How easy is it for a voter to accidentally input a vote they did not
intend? How easy (and reliable) is it for a voter to correct such an occurrance if it takes place? Do the poll watchers thoroughly understand the system, and can they explain it clearly to the voters...and can they identify misfunctions when such occur? Does the system allow careful tracking and recording of votes, so that a recount can easily be made if needed? Is all software that operates the system publicly available (as it should be)? (USA)
39. In a UK general election, people vote by making a cross on a piece of paper. With a few exceptions, the votes are all counted the same evening, and the actual final counts are reported the same evening. I have not heard of a better system, and cannot understand why that system cannot be adopted in the USA. My suspicion is the much more complicated voting system in the USA and the Electoral College has more to do with
manipulating votes than guaranteeing a fair election. While the voting system is run by elected officials of the two major political parties, I hold out little hope that things will improve. (UK)
40. Existing electronic touch screens are inherently less reliable and more easily subjct to manipulation of results than are the older mechanical "lever" machines. Fraud resistant electronic machines should use hard - wired logic, and not software programming to control operation. Touch screens do not provide proper kenesthetic feedback. (USA)
41. Creating a paper audit trail is absolutely necessary. Although e-voting may be convenient, any procedure that leaves only an electronic record is certain to be abused. Several states have explored means of creating such a paper audit trail: Either by electronically reading marked paper ballots, which are then retained; or, by printing a paper record of the screen-touch vote, which may then be inspected by the voter and which is retained. (USA)
42. Not that electronic voting technologies aren't reliable and accurate. Just not any more so than older technologies. (USA)
43. I trust the machines, but not the programmers or administrators. Fraud can and will be committed, both now and in the future. (USA)
44. The voting may have gone well this time, but voting with out a paper printout to allow manual verification is inviting disaster and abuse. (USA)
45. Touch screen electronic voting is more more accurate and trustworthy when backed up by an auditable paper trail. (USA)
46. I am afraid that computer technology with touch screen voting is intimidating to a large portion of the population and kept people from the polls. Some voted by absentee ballot, but many of those were deemed invalid. The best and least expensive voting procedure is to use paper ballots that can be read electronically. (USA)
47. There needs to be a paper trail to document the procedure.That said, the comparison with paper ballots and punch cards is a no-brainer. Optic readers may be best of all, but I am not familiar with their accuracy. (USA)
48. Vote-counting reliability is not a function of electronic versus other voting technologies but rather the way any voting method is administered and whether or not there is an independent way to verify counts if questions arise. Electronic machines with no hard-copy backup are not inherently trustworthy. (USA)
49. Computer programs can distort results by simple difficult to find statements imbedded in the code by the programmer. This can be done even if the voting device prints a correct voting receipt. The chances for fraud are legion.
Mechanical devices are much simpler and can be understood by almost every user. Substitution of ink marks on the ballot eliminates wear induced imprecision that prevents cleanly punched holes. (USA)
50. I think the old mechanical voting machines (like those used in New York City for over 50 years) are reliable, auditable and sturdy. If they are wearing out and the original manufacturer is no longer in business (probably because the machines last so long) why not reverse-engineer them and build more. The original patents must have long since expired. (USA)
51. I believe that the new voting machines have the potential of recording a more accurate vote, but they will not recieve the public's trust until their results are shown to be both verifiable and accurate. (USA)
52. Accuracy of new voting technologies is still unknown. At the very least a paper trail is imperative. Our voting systems are a mess from partisanship at the level of the state secretaries of state, to inconsistent and unmonitored voting registration rules, to proprietary and non-transparent vote counting technologies, to long waiting lines at some polling places etc etc etc. (USA)
53. Having voted via a paper ballot which had ovals to black in, I feel more comfortable with this paper system than with the eletronic touch screen method. With the advent of a verifiable - paper backup printed system - or other tamperproof system, then the fast electronic methods become practical. (USA)
54. How can we know whether it is accurate when we cannot compare it with a hard copy? We need a number of such tests and their results to evaluate the accuracy of the machines. (USA)
55. Living in Nevada, I had no option to the touch-screen machine; however, we received a paper confirmation with a traceable number. I have submitted a FOI Act request to determine if my vote was registered correctly. I will know someday. (USA)
56. (1.) Personal experience: At a local school bond election 6 weeks before the national election, I discovered that the new electronic voting machines have a button on the outside of the machine that must be pushed by a poll worker before one's vote can count. The voter cannot see the poll worker press the button, since it is on the outside of the booth.
Occasionally, as in my case, the poll worker forgets to push the button. "An honest mistake," the poll worker apologized to me. "Yes, but what if a less honest poll worker didn't want to count the votes of those who, say, look different?" I asked. "That would never happen," the poll worker explained. "We are required to be honest to serve as poll workers." To make matters worse, when one attempts to vote when the poll worker has not pressed the outside button, lights go on and off on the touch-screen next to the choices, simulating the experience of voting. And, to compound the problem, since there is no paper confirmation, one never knows if the vote counted or not. According to the poll worker, the only way to know a vote counted is to listen for a high-pitched beep. However, since I'm not particularly good at hearing high-pitched tones, especially in crowded and noisy places, I couldn't hear the beep.
(2). According to a computer science professor at Princeton, it takes a good computer hacker less than 10 seconds to figure out the voting machine's password, get in, reprogram the machine to count a percentage of votes for one candidate as being for the other candidate, and get out. (Note: the hacker wouldn't want to switch all of the votes for one
candidate for the other one; that would be too suspicious.) If, for example, 10% of Kerry's votes in critical counties went to Bush, how would we ever know? When asked about security before the election day, he said that the machines are generally kept at the polling places the night before--for example, in the cafeterias of elementary schools. (USA)
57. At best, computer-based voting should be as reliable and accurate as any other computer-based operation, as banking. In absence of evidence that the use of computers in the voting booths of the recent election were not well-programmed and tested and verified beofre and after their use in the voting booth, there is no reason to assume unreliable and inaccurate results. (USA)
58. In principle, touch screen systems seem more accurate and reliable, but they do require a certain amount of trust in the way the system is managed. Without a paper audit trail, there's always room for doubts about what happens inside the black box: A rapid, 100% reliable electronic recount might simply mean that the finger is set firmly on the
scale. For that matter, the old question of what happens to the black box still remains. (USA)